

# وجوب التكليف الإلهي في المنظومة الفكرية للعدلية ونقد رؤية الأشاعرة، بالتركيز على آثار الغزالي وعلامة الحلبي

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## الملخص

مسألة "وجوب التكليف الإلهي" تُعد من المباحث الأساسية والتحديّة في علم الكلام الإسلامي، وهي تُظهر الاختلاف العميق بين مدرستي الأشاعرة والعدلية فيما يتعلق بذات الله وصفاته وعلاقته بالعالم. تتناول هذه الدراسة بالمنهج التحليلي-الاستدلالي، بالاعتماد على الأعمال المحورية لأبي حامد الغزالي (الممثل البارز للأشاعرة) وعلامة الحلبي (الشخصية المحورية في كلام العدلية الإمامية)، مسألة وجوب التكليف على الله أم كونه أمراً اختيارياً يخضع لإرادته المطلقة؟ فمن وجهة نظر الأشاعرة، مع إنكار "الحسن والقبح العقليين"، يُرفض أي إلزام عقلي أو أخلاقي على الذات الإلهية، ويُفسّر التكليف بوصفه تجلياً محضاً لإرادة الله غير المعلولة وغير المحدودة؛ أي أن الله كان يمكنه أن يخلق عالماً بلا تكليف ولا ثواب ولا عقاب، وهذا الفعل لا يُسمى عادلاً ولا ظالماً، لأن معايير العدل والظلم تقتفر إلى المعنى قبل ورود الشرع. في المقابل، تقبل العدلية أصل "الحسن والقبح العقليين" وتؤكد على صفات الكمال الإلهية - ولا سيما الحكمة والعدل واللفظ - فترى وجوب التكليف ضرورةً ذاتية؛ لأن ترك هداية العباد المستعدين يتنافى مع كمالات الذات الإلهية، ويُعدّ عبثاً أو إغراءً بالقبح. ويستدل علامة الحلبي على أن حكمة الله الذاتية تقتضي وضع تكليف مقترن بأسباب الهداية (كالنبوة)، لا حاجة منه، بل بوصفه تجلياً ضرورياً للرحمة واللفظ الإلهيين. وتُظهر الدراسة أن رؤية العدلية لا تتناغم مع الأدلة العقلية فحسب، بل ومع الآيات القرآنية والفطرة البشرية أيضاً، وهي تُعزز أسس معقولة الدين وثبات الأخلاق العالمية والعدل الإلهي ومسؤولية الإنسان. في المقابل، فإن رؤية الأشاعرة، بنسبيتها القيمية وإنكارها دور العقل في اكتشاف الخير والشر، تؤدي إلى نتائج لا تتناسب مع العدل وغائية الخلق وثبات النظام التشريعي. ونتيجةً لذلك، فإن وجوب التكليف على الله - بمعنى الوجود العقلي الناشئ عن صفاته الكمالية - لا يعد منطقياً وقرائناً فحسب، بل ضرورةً لحفظ تقديس الذات الإلهية الحقيقي وتبرير البنية الكلية للدين من النبوة إلى المعاد.

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### المقدمة

تعدُّ مسألة وجوب التكليف الإلهي، بوصفها أحد المباحث الأساسية والتحدية في علم الكلام الإسلامي، محور اختلاف عميق بين مدرستي الأشاعرة والعدلية الرئيسيتين. تتناول هذه الدراسة السؤال الرئيسي الآتي: هل التكليف الشرعي الصادر عن الله أمر واجب وضروري أم هو مجرد فعل اختياري يخضع لإرادته المحضة؟ إن هذا السؤال ليس مجرد بحث فقهي أو أصولي، بل هو متجذر في منظومتين فكريتين متميزتين حول الذات والصفات الإلهية، ودور العقل في اكتشاف الأحكام، ومفاهيم العدل والحكمة. وتكمن ضرورة إجراء هذه الدراسة في بيان الآثار العملية والنظرية لكل رؤية على مفاهيم كالعادل الإلهي ومعقولية الدين والثبات الأخلاقي ومسؤولية الإنسان. والهدف العام هو تحليل ومقارنة أسس الأشاعرة والعدلية مع التركيز على آراء شخصيتين بارزتين، وهما أبو حامد الغزالي (ت. ٥٠٥ هـ) ممثلاً للأشاعرة، وعلامة الحلّي (ت. ٧٢٦ هـ) ممثلاً للعدلية الإمامية. والسؤال الرئيسي للبحث هو: كيف عالج هذان المفكران مسألة وجوب التكليف الإلهي أو اختياريته، وتناسبه مع عدل الله وحكمته؟ والهدف النهائي هو تقديم دفاع أكثر اتساقاً عن موقف العدلية استناداً إلى الأدلة العقلية والنقلية، ويكون مجال البحث مقتصراً على دراسة النصوص الكلامية المحورية لهاتين الشخصيتين والمقارنة التطبيقية لرؤاهما في هذا المجال الخاص.

### المنهجية

هذه الدراسة من نوع البحوث الأساسية-النظرية ذات المنهج النوعي، وقد أُجريت بالطريقة التحليلية-الاستدلالية. وكان تصميم البحث مقارنياً-تحليلياً، يتناول المقارنة المنهجية بين نموذجين (بارادايمن) فكريين. وتكوّن مجتمع البحث من النصوص والأعمال الكلامية المتعلقة بمدرستي الأشاعرة والعدلية، مع أخذ عينات هادفة ومركزة على عمليين بارزين: أعمال الغزالي ومنها "الاقتصاد في الاعتقاد" و"تهافت الفلاسفة" و"مجموعة رسائل"، وأعمال علامة الحلّي ومنها "كشف المراد في شرح تجريد الاعتقاد" و"نهج الحق وكشف الصدق". وكانت أداة جمع البيانات هي التلخيص المكتبي من النصوص الأصلية وتحليلها المحتوى النوعي. ولزيادة صدق البحث، وُظف الاستشهاد المباشر بعبارات وأدلة النصوص الأصلية، وضمّن ثبات التحليلات من خلال المراجعة المقارنة للمفاهيم المحورية. وكانت طريقة تحليل البيانات هي الاستدلال المنطقي والقياسي لإعادة بناء المنظومة الفكرية لكل مدرسة ثم مقارنتها تطبيقياً استناداً إلى مفاهيم محورية مثل الحسن والقبح، والإرادة الإلهية، والعدل، واللفظ. وتضمنت خطوات تنفيذ البحث: تحديد المفاهيم والمصطلحات المحورية، ودراسة المسار التاريخي للمسألة، واستخراج وتوضيح أسس كل مدرسة من المصادر الأصلية، وأخيراً المقارنة والنقد والاستنتاج.

## النتائج

تُظهر نتائج البحث أن اختلاف الأشاعرة والعدلية في مسألة وجوب التكليف الإلهي نابع من أسس مختلفة تماماً. فمن منظور الأشاعرة، الذي يمثل الغزالي، ليس التكليف الإلهي واجباً بل هو مجرد تجلٍ للإرادة المطلقة والملكية الحصرية لله. وتقوم هذه الرؤية على أربعة أسس رئيسية: أولاً، حصر الحسن والقبح في الأمر والنهي الشرعيين؛ أي أن العقل غير قادر بمفرده على إدراك حسن العدل أو قبح الظلم، وتُحدّد القيم بأمر الله فحسب. ثانياً، إطلاق الإرادة والمشية الإلهية؛ أي أن إرادة الله مطلقة، غير معلولة، وغير مقيدة بأي قيد عقلي أو أخلاقي. ثالثاً، نظرية الكسب التي تحاول، بتفسير خاص لفعل الإنسان، الحفاظ على توحيد الأفعال وتبرير مسؤولية الإنسان، لكنها تنزلق عملياً نحو الجبرية. رابعاً، نفي أي غاية أو علة غائية عن أفعال الله؛ لأن نسب الغاية إلى فعل الله يُعدُّ مُستلزماً للحاجة والنقص في الذات الغنية. وبناءً على ذلك، كان يمكن لله أن يخلق عالماً بلا تكليف ولا ثواب ولا عقاب، ولن يُعدّ هذا الفعل عادلاً ولا ظالماً. في المقابل، تظهر النتائج أن العدلية، بالاعتماد على أسسها، ترى وجوب التكليف ضرورة ذاتية وعقلية. ويُأسس علامة الحلّي، بوصفه الشخصية البارزة في هذه المدرسة، هذا الوجود على عدة أسس: أولاً، الحسن والقبح العقليان؛ فالعقل يدرك حسن العدل وقبح الظلم مستقلاً عن الشرع، وهذا أساس العدل الإلهي. ثانياً، تلازم الصفات الذاتية لله (كالحكمة والعدل) مع أفعاله ضرورة؛ فالله حكيم ذاته، وأفعاله، بما فيها التكليف، لا يمكن أن تكون عبثاً أو تخلو من المصلحة. ثالثاً، افتراض الغائية في الأفعال الإلهية؛ فالعقل يُعدُّ الفعل غير الهادف (العبث) قبيحاً، والله منزه عن كل قبيح، لذا يجب أن يكون للتكليف هدف كهداية العباد وسعادتهم. رابعاً، وجوب اللطف الإلهي؛ فالمقصود باللطف كل ما يقرب العبد من الطاعة ويبعده عن المعصية، وهو واجب على الله بحكم حكمته ورحمته الذاتيتين، والتكليف هو المصدق الأتم لهذا اللطف. خامساً، احتياج الإنسان الدائم إلى القوانين الإلهية؛ فبسبب تركيبته الوجودية والفطرية، وعجز العقل عن إدراك تفصيلات المصالح والمفاسد، يكون التشريع الإلهي ضرورياً. سادساً، لزوم الإغراء بالقباح في حال عدم وجوب التكليف؛ فإذا ترك الله الإنسان القابل للخطأ من دون هداية شرعية، فإنه يكون قد ساقه عملياً نحو القبيح، وهذا ذاته فعل قبيح يناقض حكمة الله. ويُظهر الفحص المقارن لآراء الغزالي وعلامة الحلّي أن نقطة الاختلاف الأساسية تكمن في قبول أو إنكار "الحسن والقبح العقليين"، وتبعاً لذلك تتلقى جميع المفاهيم المرتبطة بالعدل واللطف وغائية الأفعال الإلهية تفسيراً مختلفاً.

## الخاتمة

انتهت هذه الدراسة، من خلال تحليل أسس الأشاعرة والعدلية في مسألة وجوب التكليف الإلهي، إلى هذه النتيجة العامة: إن رؤية العدلية - مع التركيز على آراء علامة الحلّي - تتمتع بمزيد من الاتساق العقلي والتناغم مع الفطرة البشرية والمزيد من التناسب مع المفاهيم القرآنية. وأظهرت النتائج أن نظرية الأشاعرة، بنفيها الحسن والقبح العقليين وإطلاقها الإرادة الإلهية، رغم تقديمها بقصد تنزيه الله، تؤدي عملياً إلى نسبية القيم الأخلاقية مطلقاً، وإضعاف العدل الإلهي (بجواز تكليف ما لا يُطاق والعقاب بلا بيان)، والإضرار بمعقولية وغائية الخلق والتشريع. في المقابل، تُتيح المنظومة الفكرية للعدلية، بقبولها اكتشاف العقل للقيم الأخلاقية وملازمة الصفات الكمالية الإلهية للأفعال الهادفة، ليس فقط تنزيه الله الحقيقي (تنزيهاً عن كل قبيح وعبث)، بل وتوفر أسساً رصينة للعدل في الثواب والعقاب، والمسؤولية الأخلاقية للإنسان، وضرورة النبوة والمعاد، وثبات النظام الأخلاقي. والتطبيق النظري لهذا البحث يتمثل في توضيح أحد أسس الخلافات الكلامية الواسعة بين المدرستين وبيان الآثار الفلسفية لكل رؤية. ومن الناحية العملية، يمكن لتعزيز رؤية العدلية أن يؤثر في تدريس العلوم الكلامية وتقوية الخطاب الديني العقلاني. والمحدد الرئيس لهذا البحث هو التركيز على شخصيتين محددتين فقط وعدم توسيع المقارنة لتشمل متكلمين آخرين من المدرستين. ويُقترح أن تُوسع الأبحاث المستقبلية هذه المقارنة لتشمل مفكرين بارزين آخرين من كل مدرسة (كالقاضي عبد الجبار من العدلية والجويني أو التفتازاني من الأشاعرة)، وأن تفحص كذلك الأسس الأنتروبولوجية (مفهوم الاختيار) لكل رؤية وأثارها في الفقه والأخلاق التطبيقية بعمق أكبر.

# An Examination of the Necessity of Divine Obligation in the System Thought of the 'Adliyyah and a Critique of the Ash'arite View, with Emphasis on the Works of Al-Ghazālī and al-'Allāmah al-Hillī

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## ABSTRACT

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The issue of "the necessity (wujub) of divine obligation (taklif)" is among the fundamental and challenging topics in Islamic theology, revealing a profound disagreement between the Ash'arite and 'Adliyyah schools concerning God's essence, attributes, and relationship with the world. Utilizing an analytical-argumentative method and relying on the seminal works of Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī (a prominent representative of the Ash'arites) and al-'Allāmah al-Hillī (a key figure in 'Adliyyah theology), this research addresses the question: Is divine obligation incumbent upon God, or is it merely a voluntary matter subject to His absolute will? From the Ash'arite perspective, with the denial of "rational moral valuation (al-husn wa al-qubh al-'aqlī)," any rational or moral necessity upon the Divine Essence is rejected. Obligation is interpreted as a pure manifestation of God's uncaused and unlimited will; meaning God could have created a world without obligation, reward, or punishment, and such an act would be termed neither just nor unjust, as the criteria for justice and injustice are meaningless prior to revealed law (shar'). In contrast, the 'Adliyyah, by accepting the principle of "rational moral valuation" and emphasizing God's perfect attributes-particularly wisdom, justice, and grace (lutf)-consider the necessity of obligation to be inherent. This is because abandoning the guidance of capable subjects is incompatible with God's essential perfections and would constitute absurdity or an inducement to evil. Al-'Allāmah al-Hillī argues that God's inherent wisdom necessitates the establishment of obligation accompanied by means of guidance (such as prophethood), not out of need, but as a necessary manifestation of divine mercy and grace. The study demonstrates that the 'Adliyyah view is consistent not only with rational evidence but also with Qur'anic verses and human nature (fitrah). It strengthens the foundations of religious rationality, universal moral stability, divine justice, and human responsibility. Conversely, the Ash'arite view, by relativizing values and denying reason's role in discerning good and evil, leads to outcomes incompatible with justice, the purposiveness of creation, and the stability of the legislative system. Consequently, the necessity of obligation upon God-in the sense of a rational necessity arising from His perfect attributes-is not only logical and Qur'anic but also essential for preserving the true sanctity of the Divine Essence and justifying the overarching structure of religion from prophethood to the hereafter.

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### Introduction and Statement of the Problem

One of the most central disagreements among Islamic theological schools, particularly between the Ash‘arites and the ‘Adliyyah, is the issue of "the necessity of obligation upon God Almighty"; not the necessity of obedience of the servants, but whether God is from a rational or grace-based perspective, obliged to establish religious obligations (taklīf) for human guidance? The ‘Adliyyah, citing principles such as "rational moral valuation" and "the necessity of divine grace," consider the establishment of obligation to be necessary, arguing that abandoning the guidance of a capable servant is incompatible with God's inherent justice and wisdom. In contrast, the Ash‘arites, by denying "rational moral valuation," reject any rational or moral necessity upon the Divine Essence, viewing obligation as solely a manifestation of God's absolute will and pure discretion. This means God's actions are explained solely based on "ownership" and "authority," with no external or rational ruling governing the Transcendent Essence.

This dispute extends beyond a jurisprudential or legal-theoretical discussion and is rooted in two different intellectual systems concerning God's essence and attributes, the role of reason in discovering rulings, and the concept of justice. Within this framework, the works of Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī—as a symbol of the Ash‘arite school—and al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī—as a prominent figure in ‘Adliyyah theology during the occultation era—represent two fundamental approaches to responding to "the question of the necessity of obligation." In works such as *al-Iqtisād fī al-I‘tiqād* and *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, al-Ghazālī views obligation as arising from God's exclusive right of ownership, while al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī, in *Kashf al-Murād* and *Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, considers the necessity of obligation to be a consequence of God's wisdom, inherent justice, and grace.

This study, using an analytical-argumentative method, addresses several questions: Is divine obligation incumbent upon God or merely discretionary? If it is necessary, what rational or grace-based foundations make it essential? And if it is discretionary, is this view compatible with divine justice and wisdom? Furthermore, how have al-Ghazālī and al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī, within the framework of their respective theological principles, answered these questions?

Thus, the main research question is: How have al-Ghazālī and al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī addressed the issue of the necessity or discretion of divine obligation and its compatibility with God's justice and wisdom?

The ultimate objective of this research, by elucidating the theological principles of both schools and analyzing the arguments of al-Ghazālī and al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī, is to provide a more coherent defense of the ʿAdliyyah position regarding "the rational necessity of obligation upon God," based on rational and scriptural evidence.

### **Background of the Research**

No independent scholarship comparative study currently carried out that specifically analyzes the issue of the necessity or discretion of divine obligation within the framework of the al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. Nevertheless, numerous manuscripts have been written in the field concerning the concept of obligation, its theological foundations, and the general perspectives of the Ashʿarite and ʿAdliyyah schools.

Among important books in this field are *The Nature and Theological Foundations of Obligation* (Muḥammad Hāshim Masʿūdī), *The Philosophy of Obligation from the Perspective of ʿAdliyyah Theologians* (Muḥsin Kāzimī), and *Human Obligation, Human Destiny* (Jawād Maḥmūdī Ardakānī). While these works contribute significantly to explaining the essence of obligation or reflecting the view of one of the theological schools, they lack an analytical comparison based on the primary theological texts of al-Ghazālī and al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī. Also, thesis such as "The Issue of Right and Obligation from the Viewpoint of the Ashʿarites and Imāmīs" (Sanāz Razmju Qashqāʿī) and "Qur'anic Foundations of Obligation-Centricity" (Arslān Khayrullāhī) have engaged in a broader comparison of the two schools, but they lack direct citation of the core theological texts of these two prominent figures, especially concerning the grace-based necessity of obligation.

On the other hand, books such as *The Philosophy of Obligation* (Muḥammad ʿAlī Fayyāḍ), *Theological Foundations of Right and Obligation* (Āyatullāh Jawādī Āmulī), and *The Presentation of the Theory of Obligation by the Shīʿah Theologians of Baghdad* (Ḥusayn

Bīrashk and Bahnām Ṭālibī), though contemplating the rational and theological dimensions of obligation, have either remained within the framework of one school or have not adopted a balanced comparative and analytical perspective when addressing the question of "the necessity of obligation upon God."

Within this context, the distinct of this research study becomes clearer: the absence of a precise, comparative, and text-based examination of the views of al-Ghazālī and al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī regarding the central question of whether divine obligation-from a rational or grace-based perspective-is necessary for the Divine Essence, or whether it is merely placed within the order of human guidance as a manifestation of absolute discretion and divine wisdom. The present research, by referencing authentic theological texts and focusing on these two pivotal intellectual figures, seeks to fill this gap, however partially.

## *1. Conceptual Analysis of Obligation (Taklīf)*

### *1.1. Obligation in Lexicology*

The root of the word "taklīf" in Arabic goes back to "kalafa," which has been used in lexical sources with various meanings. One of these meanings is "intense inclination or love"; as al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī writes in al-ʿAyn: "al-kalaf: al-īlāʿ bi al-shayʿ" (al-Farāhīdī, al-ʿAyn, Vol. 5, p. 372). Ibn Fāris also confirms this meaning, considering it one of the connotations of the root "klf" (Ibn Fāris, Maqāyīs al-Lughah, Vol. 5, p. 136).

Another meaning found in lexical texts for this root is "a mole or colored spot on the face." Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī in Mufradāt Alfāz al-Qurʾān explains that "al-kalaf fī al-wajh" is so named because its owner feels discomfort or "kulfah" (hardship) from its presence (al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt, p. 721). Ibn Manẓūr also mentions this usage, considering it among the secondary meanings of the word (Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿArab, Vol. 9, p. 307).

However, the meaning used in the domains of jurisprudence and theology goes beyond these metaphorical or emotional usages. Ismāʿīl al-Jawharī writes: "kallafahu taklīfan" means "amarahū bi-mā yashuqq

‘alayh"; that is, he commanded him to do something that is difficult and burdensome for him (al-Jawharī, al-Ṣiḥāḥ, Vol. 4, p. 1424). This meaning is also reflected in al-Farāhīdī's al-‘Ayn (al-Farāhīdī, al-‘Ayn, Vol. 5, p. 372). More importantly, the meaning of "compulsion" is clearly presented in later lexical sources. In al-Mu‘jam al-Wasīṭ, the act of obligation is defined as: "A command issued by its issuer-as the authority possessing the right of obligation-to compel the performance of a duty" (Authors' Collective, al-Mu‘jam al-Wasīṭ, Vol. 2, p. 795). Abū Hilāl al-‘Askarī also places the word "taklīf" under the category of compulsion, emphasizing that this compulsion is usually accompanied by hardship or difficulty (al-‘Askarī, al-Furūq fī al-Lughah, Vol. 1, p. 210). This point is also mentioned in Tāj al-‘Arūs (al-Zabīdī, Tāj al-‘Arūs, Vol. 12, p. 465).

In Persian dictionaries as well, "taklīf" is defined as duty, order, or work accompanied by compulsion and hardship; for example, in Farhang-e Abjadi (translation of al-Munjid), where "taklīf" is defined as "hardship, trouble, duty, order, and command" (Fu‘ād Afrām al-Bustānī, Farhang-e Abjadi, p. 735).

In light of this examination, it can be concluded that although the word "kalaf" in Arabic has referred to different meanings, including intense love and facial blemishes, in the context of "taklīf"-especially in theological and jurisprudential texts-the primary meaning is the compulsion to perform an act whose fulfillment or omission is difficult for the obligated person. This meaning, as also indicated in Lisān al-‘Arab, not only emphasizes the linguistic layer of the word but also serves as the foundation for the technical concept of "taklīf" in theological discussions about the necessity of divine obligation, divine grace, and justice.

### *1.2. Obligation in Theological Terminology*

In Islamic theological discussions, the term "taklīf" has been used with different meanings, reflecting the fundamental differences in theological principles among various schools (Makārim Shīrāzī, Dā‘irat al-Ma‘ārif al-Fiḥ al-Muqāran, Vol. 1, p. 72).

Some theologians have defined obligation as a demand or command accompanied by hardship and difficulty; from this view, obligation

inherently has an objective dimension of "kulfah" (difficulty). This approach is prominent in the definitions of key figures of the 'Adliyyah and Imāmīs: al-Shaykh al-Mufīd writes: "Obligation means compelling someone to do something that is heavy and difficult for a human to perform" (al-Mufīd, *Awā'il al-Maqālāt*, p. 113). Al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā also defines it as "demanding something from another that is accompanied by hardship and difficulty" (al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, *al-Dhakhīrah*, p. 105). The Mu'tazilī Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār also emphasizes that obligation "is accompanied by difficulty, but does not reach the level of necessity" (Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah*, p. 344; *al-Muḥīṭ bi al-Taklīf*, p. 11).

In contrast, others-particularly among the Ash'arites-have defined obligation more absolutely, as compulsion or a command from God, regardless of the presence or absence of hardship. Al-Ghazālī says: "Taklīf... its meaning is compelling to do something that involves hardship," but elsewhere he explicitly states that "it is not necessary to be agreeable to one's nature or desire," which indicates that his focus is more on the command's suitability for compulsion than on the essence of hardship (Dughaym Samī', *Mawsū'at Muṣṭalahāt al-Imām al-Ghazālī*, p. 180). This approach aligns with the Ash'arite principle of negating rational necessity upon God.

Furthermore, there are definitions that consider obligation as a command or summons from someone whose obedience is obligatory, as al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī writes: "Obligation is the will of the one who wills (the Lawgiver) regarding a hardship-inducing matter" (al-Ṭūsī, *al-Tibyān*, Vol. 3, p. 524). Ibn Maytham al-Baḥrānī defines it as "the summons and command of one whose obedience is primarily obligatory" (al-Baḥrānī, *Qawā'id al-Marām*, Vol. 1, p. 114).

Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī provided a more comprehensive structural and content-based technical definition of obligation. They define it as "the primary will of one whose obedience is obligatory for a matter accompanied by hardship, on the condition that he informs the doer about his demand" (al-Ṭūsī, *Kashf al-Fawā'id*, p. 69; al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-Murād*, p. 297). This definition encompasses inherent compulsion (the will of the Lawgiver), the existence of

hardship, and the conditions of rationality (the obligated's awareness), and within the framework of the discussion on "the necessity of obligation upon God"-the core of the present research-it aligns most closely with the principles of the 'Adliyyah (such as grace, justice, and rational moral valuation).

Therefore, despite the various definitions of obligation exist in Islamic theology, the technical meaning intended in this research-which is raised in the discussion of the necessity or discretion of divine obligation-is the one that includes both legal compulsion and association with hardship, while also incorporating the obligated person's capacity for awareness and rational choice-a matter well-reflected in al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī's definition.

## ***2. Conceptual Analysis of Necessity (Wujūb)***

### ***2.1. Necessity in Lexicology***

"Wujūb" lexically means necessity, inevitability, and inherent coherence between two things; meaning the separation of one from the other is impossible; as it is said: "A predicate is inseparable from its subject" (Shīrāzī, al-Ṭirāz al-Awwal, Vol. 8, p. 290; al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Mufradāt Alfāz al-Qur'ān, p. 555; al-Ṭurayḥī, Majma' al-Baḥrayn, Vol. 3, p. 15).

### ***2.2. Necessity in Terminology***

In jurisprudential terminology, "wujūb" refers to an obligation imposed by the sacred Lawgiver upon the obligated person, such as the obligation of prayer, fasting, or returning trusts; their omission makes one deserving of punishment (al-Shahīd al-Thānī, Tamhīd al-Qawā'id, pp. 34–35; al-Subḥānī al-Tabrizī, Farhang-e 'Aqā'id wa Madhāhib-e Islāmī, pp. 545–546; al-Ṣadr, Durūs fī 'Ilm al-Uṣūl, Vol. 1, p. 63; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, Vol. 1, p. 93; al-Mushkinī, Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Uṣūl, p. 280). Jurisprudential obligation essentially has three pillars: the commander (lawgiver), the commanded (the obligated), and the commanded act. Given this meaning, jurisprudential necessity is outside the scope of the present discussion because no one argues for jurisprudential necessity upon God Almighty, as God here is only the commander, and given His essence as the commander, no compulsion or obligation applies to Him.

In theological terminology, "wujūb" is discussed in various contexts and generally means the necessity and requirement of an act from an agent, considering the agent's essential attributes (natural or volitional) (al-Ṭūsī, Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, p. 342; Fayyād, Muḥāḍarāt fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, Vol. 1, p. 401; al-Subḥānī, al-Ilāhiyyāt ‘alā Hudā al-Kitāb wa al-Sunnah wa al-‘Aql, Vol. 4, p. 121). Sometimes it is used to mean compulsion, requirement, and the impossibility of omitting the act (al-Ṭūsī, Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, p. 342; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb, Vol. 22, p. 132; Qāḍī Nūrullāh, 1409 AH, Vol. 2, p. 187; al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal, pp. 37, 88). Considering the meanings and applications of "wujūb" in theological discussions, it becomes clear that "wujūb" here has only two pillars: the agent and the act. Therefore, "wujūb" in theology means the definite necessity and requirement of an act issuing from an agent, due to the agent's essential attributes and perfections, not due to an external law or compulsion. The source of theological necessity is also the agent's essence and attributes.

### ***3. Types of Obligation: Revealed (Sam‘ī) and Rational (‘Aqlī)***

In Islamic theological and jurisprudential thought, obligation is divided into two categories: rational and revealed (or legal) obligation. This classification has been a basis for distinguishing between the sciences of theology and jurisprudence; such that Abū al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī in his book al-Kāfī divided it into two sections: "rational obligations" (theology) and "revealed obligations" (jurisprudence) (Abū al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī, al-Kāfī, pp. 33, 107; also al-Mufīd, Awā‘il al-Maqālāt, p. 44; al-Karājī, Kanz al-Fawā‘id, p. 110; Ibn Zuhrah, Ghanīyat al-Nuzū‘, p. 33; ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Ḥalabī, Ishārat al-Sabaq, p. 66).

Rational obligations refer to those duties that become incumbent upon the obligated person by the dictate of pure reason, without the need for revelation or legal text. The ‘Adliyyah theologians (Imāmī Shī‘ah and Mu‘tazilah) believe that reason can discern the goodness and badness of acts, and the first obligation is "the rational necessity of contemplating the proofs for knowing God" (al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, al-Dhakhīrah, pp. 170–171; and Rasā‘il, Vol. 3, p. 15).

However, obligation existed even before the mission of the prophets; for example, Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār considers the primary obligation to be "knowing God" (Mānkḍīm, *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsah*, pp. 39, 72; ‘Uthmān, *Nazariyyat al-Taklīf*, p. 86; al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-Murād*, p. 375).

Revealed obligations are the rulings communicated to the obligated person through the Book and the Sunnah; for instance, what is discussed in the science of jurisprudence. These obligations rest on two bases: a) Confirmation of the truthfulness of the prophets, which itself relies on rational obligations (al-Jaṣṣās, *al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl*, Vol. 3, p. 380; al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā*, p. 6); b) Non-contradiction with rational obligations (al-Karājī, *Kanz al-Fawā’id*, p. 101; al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād*, pp. 133–134). Revelation is only applicable in cases where reason itself does not stipulate an obligation (al-Mufīd, *Taṣḥīḥ I’tiqādāt al-Imāmiyyah*, p. 143; al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā*, p. 6).

From the ‘Adliyyah perspective, revealed obligations complement rational obligations, rather than replacing them. The mission of the prophets is considered a "divine grace" to provide motivation for fulfilling rational obligations (Mānkḍīm, *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsah*, p. 565; al-Ṭūsī, *al-Iqtisād*, pp. 246–247; al-Rāwandī, *al-Kharā’ij wa al-Jarā’ih*, Vol. 3, p. 1061).

In contrast, the Ash‘arites and traditionalist jurists deny rational obligation and believe that the necessity of obligation is known only through revelation; meaning if God has not commanded something, reason cannot deem it obligatory (Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī*, p. 285; al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al-Aqdām*, p. 371; al-Juwaynī, *Luma’ al-Adillah*, p. 108). For them, the goodness of an obligation is not because of itself, but because it is "an act of God" (Ibn Fūrak, *ibid.*, pp. 141–142).

Therefore, in the ‘Adliyyah system, reason is an independent source preceding revelation, while from the Ash‘arite perspective, God's will is considered the sole source of obligation, and reason cannot have any role in discerning obligations.

#### *4. Historical-Theological Development of the Debate on the Necessity of Obligation between the Ash‘arites and the ‘Adliyyah*

The discussion of obligation in Islamic theology has its roots in the first centuries of Hijrah, taking shape in response to questions about human responsibility for their actions. In the half of the first century AH, Ma‘bad al-Juhanī (d. 80 AH) and Ghaylān al-Dimashqī (d. 117 AH) took a stance emphasizing human free will against the predestinarians who considered all acts to be created by God. This view faced opposition from Companions such as ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb (al-Tirmidhī, al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaḥīḥ, Vol. 5, p. 6; Ibn Mandah, al-Īmān, Vol. 1, pp. 116–117; al-Lālakā’ī, Sharḥ Uṣūl I‘tiqād Ahl al-Sunnah, Vol. 4, p. 750).

In contrast, predestinarians such as Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128 AH) believed all acts are God's creation, and humans are only metaphorically considered agents; because the real agent is God. This view faced the objection: How can one reward or punish a human who is not the real agent? (al-Nāshī’ al-Akbar, al-Awsaṭ fī al-Maqālāt, p. 92; al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa al-Qadar, pp. 28, 30).

In response to this view, the Mu‘tazilah and Imāmīs emphasized the principle of divine justice, stating: Since God is just, He cannot obligate someone to do something beyond their capability. Therefore, capacity (real ability to perform the act) in the obligated person is a prerequisite for obligation (Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, Faḍl al-I‘tizāl, pp. 147–148; Ibn Shādhān, al-Īḍāḥ, p. 6).

The Mu‘tazilah considered capacity to exist before the act, while some theologians such as Ḍirār ibn ‘Amr (d. 190 AH), Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218 AH), and Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Najjār (d. 220 AH) considered capacity to be simultaneous with the act (al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, Inqādh al-Bashar, pp. 28–32; al-Khayyāt, al-Intiṣār, pp. 61–62; al-Nāshī’ al-Akbar, al-Awsaṭ fī al-Maqālāt, p. 95; al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt al-Islāmīyyīn, pp. 42–43, 72–73, 108, 231–235).

In determining the identity of the "obligated person," Abū al-Hudhayl considered the human to be the visible body (al-Ash‘arī, Maqālāt, pp. 329, 337), while Ibrāhīm al-Nazzām (d. 221 AH)

considered it to be a soul connected to the body (ibid., p. 331). However, most Mu‘tazilah and Imāmīs accepted the definition of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī (d. 321 AH): A human is a living, capable being upon whom command, prohibition, blame, and praise apply (Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, Vol. 11, p. 311; *al-Majmū‘*, Vol. 2, pp. 241–246; al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, *al-Dhakhīrah*, pp. 113–114; Ḥimṣī al-Rāzī, *al-Munqidh min al-Taqlīd*, Vol. 1, pp. 291–292).

The Mu‘tazilah and Imāmīs, by proposing rational moral valuation, divided obligation into two categories: rational and revealed. Rational obligation—such as knowing God—was necessary even before the mission of the prophet (Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsah* (Mānkḍīm's text), pp. 39, 72; ‘Uthmān, *Naẓariyyat al-Taklīf*, p. 86; al-‘Allāmah al-Hillī, *Kashf al-Murād*, p. 375; al-Isfarāyīnī, *al-Tabṣīr fī al-Dīn*, pp. 66, 70). The mission of the prophets was also for divine grace and to provide motivation for fulfilling these obligations (Mānkḍīm, *Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Khamsah*, p. 565; al-Ṭūsī, *al-Iqtisād*, pp. 246–247; al-Rāwandī, *al-Kharā‘ij wa al-Jarā‘ih*, Vol. 3, p. 1061).

In contrast, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī, criticizing Mu‘tazilī foundations, said: Rational moral valuation does not exist; rather, obligation is known only through revelation (Qur‘ān and Sunnah), and God's will is the sole source of obligation. He even considered *taklīf mā lā yuṭāq* (obligation beyond capacity) permissible (Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad Maqālāt al-Shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī*, p. 285; al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al-Aqdām*, p. 371; al-Juwaynī, *Luma‘ al-Adillah*, p. 108; al-Ash‘arī, *al-Luma‘*, p. 54; *Risālah ilā Ahl al-Thaghr*, pp. 264–265; al-Māwardī, *A‘lām al-Nubuwwah*, p. 42; Ibn Taymiyyah, *Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawīyah*, Vol. 3, p. 104).

For al-Ash‘arī, obligation is good because it is God's act, not because of itself (Ibn Fūrak, *Mujarrad...*, pp. 141–142, 147–148). Also, reward is God's favor, and punishment is His justice; not that a human, by dictate of reason, deserves reward (al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 1, pp. 101–102).

From the 4th century AH onwards, the discussion of obligation became an inseparable part of divine justice discussions in the works of Imāmī theologians (such as Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār in *al-Mughnī*, Vol. 11,

and al-Majmū‘ fī al-Muḥīṭ bi al-Taklīf) and the Mu‘tazilah. On the other side, Ash‘arite theologians also critiqued this theory (al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-Dīn, pp. 206–207; al-Ghazālī, al-Iqtisād fī al-I‘tiqād, p. 114).

Following this, the most important principles of the Ash‘arites and ‘Adliyyah regarding the issue of obligation, its necessity or non-necessity upon God Almighty, will be presented and examined.

### ***5. The Principles of the Ash‘arites Regarding the Non-Necessity of Obligation upon God Almighty***

The Ash‘arite school, relying on principles such as "revealed moral valuation" and "the absoluteness of divine will," considers obligation to be a completely discretionary act lacking rational necessity for God. Here, these principles are examined in more detail:

#### ***5.1. Revealed Moral Valuation (al-Ḥusn wa al-Qubḥ al-Shar‘ī)***

Among theological discussions, one of the most central disagreements between the Ash‘arites on one hand and the ‘Adliyyah (Imāmī Shī‘ah and Mu‘tazilah) on the other revolves around "rational moral valuation". Contrary to the common understanding, the point of contention in this discussion is the deservingness of a just agent for praise and an unjust agent for blame by reason-not merely the compatibility or incompatibility of acts with nature or benefit (al-Taftāzānī, Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, Vol. 4, p. 282). The ‘Adliyyah believe reason can independently discern such deservingness, while the Ash‘arites do not accept this capability for reason and consider such deservingness to be solely dependent on the divine law and God's command and prohibition (al-Jurjānī, Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, Vol. 8, p. 192; al-Qūshjī, Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, p. 347).

From the Ash‘arite perspective, "goodness" and "badness," in the sense of deserving reward or punishment in the divine court, are purely revealed; meaning apart from God's command and prohibition, there is no basis for praise or blame. In this view, obligation is considered good because God has commanded it-not due to the essence of that action, any inherent benefit in it, or a rational relationship between it and good or evil (al-Maqrīzī, al-Mawā‘iẓ wa al-I‘tibār, Vol. 2, p. 360). Therefore, "if God commands something, it is good; and if He prohibits it, it is evil."

This perspective entails that no obligation is necessary upon God; because making something necessary for the Sacred Divine Essence means "imposing obligation upon the Creator of obligations," which is incompatible with God's sanctity and inherent independence (Hamadānī Asadābādī, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah*, p. 209). Therefore, the Ashʿarites even reject the rational necessity of justice or the impossibility of injustice from God, arguing: "Reason cannot determine what God must or must not do; because God has no responsibility or accountability" (*al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 1, pp. 101–102).

However, the subtle point is that the ʿAdliyyah in no way deny the truth that "no one can impose obligation upon God." Rather, what they mean by "rational necessity" is reason's discovery of what God has made necessary for Himself. For example, reason, relying on rational axioms, understands that injustice contradicts God's essential status; therefore, God is transcendent above any injustice (*al-Ḥillī, Nahj al-Ḥaqq wa Kashf al-Ṣidq*, p. 83). This rational discovery is confirmed by the Qurʾān: "Indeed, Allah does not do injustice, [even] as much as an atom's weight" (Qurʾān 4:40).

In contrast, the Ashʿarites, by confining goodness and badness to divine command and prohibition, deny any rational or beneficial relationship between obligation and the subjects' benefit. The ʿAdliyyah, however, believe that God, due to His inherent grace and mercy, is rationally obliged to establish obligation for the subjects, because obligation is a means for attaining otherworldly benefit (*al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, al-Dhakhīrah*, p. 108; *al-Ṭūsī, al-Iqtisād*, p. 64).

Accepting the Ashʿarite theory has fundamental and dangerous consequences: If goodness and badness are completely variable and dependent on the Lawgiver's command, no ruling will be absolute or stable; because whatever is good today, tomorrow-if God's command changes-will become evil. Such a view renders all ethical and legal principles relative, temporary, and unreliable (*al-Muzaffar, Dalāʾil al-Ṣidq*, Vol. 3, pp. 260–272). Interestingly, even the Ashʿarites themselves in practice-such as in the discussion of the necessity of Imamate for preserving social order-use concepts that, without a rational or beneficial basis, are groundless and inconsistent within the framework of their own theory.

In conclusion, the Ash'arites, by denying rational necessity and rational moral valuation, not only endanger the concept of divine justice but also eliminate the stability and discipline of divine rulings and ethical principles. In contrast, the 'Adliyyah theory, by accepting rational moral valuation and the necessity of divine grace, preserves the inherent dignity and honor of humanity and guarantees the stability and rationality of the divine legislative system.

### *5.2. The Absoluteness of Divine Will and Volition*

In the Ash'arite theological school, divine will and volition are absolute and unlimited. From the Ash'arite perspective, God is the absolute owner of the created world, and nothing-including the acts of subjects, the existence or non-existence of obligation, justice or injustice-lies outside His will. This will is an "uncaused cause"; meaning it is not an effect of any other cause, and no rational, moral, or existential constraint can restrict it (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr*, Vol. 14, pp. 126, 135).

Therefore, the obligation of servants is also purely from God's will, not arising from a necessity incumbent upon God's essence. The Ash'arites, including al-Ghazālī, believe:

"...Creation, invention, and obligation are done out of favor, not out of necessity; and grace and beneficence are done as an obligation of generosity, not as a requirement. So favor, beneficence, grace, and blessing belong to none but Him. For He is capable of imposing all kinds of punishment upon the servants and afflicting them with various pains and sufferings; and if He did so, it would be justice, not ugliness or injustice. And He grants reward to servants for their obedience based on generosity and the fulfillment of promise, not based on deservingness and necessity. For no act is necessary upon Him, and injustice is inconceivable from Him, and no one has a necessary right against Him. And His right upon servants regarding obedience is due to His stipulation through the tongues of His messengers, not by mere reason. However, He sent messengers and manifested their truthfulness through miracles, and they conveyed His commands, prohibitions, promises, and threats. And it became obligatory upon creation to believe in what they brought." (al-Ghazālī, *al-Arba'īn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn*, 1409 AH, Vol. 1, pp. 13–14).

Within this framework, if God leaves a human as a disbeliever, places someone in Hell, or imposes obligation upon servants, or even if He does not, none of these acts are, from a rational perspective (without the revealed law), evil or good; because goodness and badness are purely revealed and dependent on God's command and prohibition (al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid*, Vol. 4, p. 282). Hence, "if God commands something, it is good; and if He prohibits it, it is evil" (al-Maqrīzī, *al-Mawā'iz wa al-I'tibār*, Vol. 2, p. 360).

This view entails that no rational necessity be posited upon God; because making something necessary upon the Creator means "imposing obligation upon the very essence that imposes obligation," which conflicts with God's sanctity and inherent independence (Hamadānī Asadābādī, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah*, p. 209). Also, since God "is not questioned about what He does" (al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 1, pp. 101–102), therefore, from reason's perspective, He "must" or "must not" do nothing.

Thus, obligation is good only because of the Lawgiver's command, not due to its essence or any benefit in it. Even if God placed a believer in Hell and a disbeliever in Paradise, this act would be neither injustice nor justice, but merely God's will-and since God's will is the source of all values, this act itself becomes absolutely good.

In this view, divine determinism is also reinforced: If everything stems from God's will and He is the complete cause of all acts, then humans are compelled in their acts. This determinism, alongside revealed moral valuation, prevents the attribution of evils to God: because God never does evil; rather, whatever He does-even if apparently evil-becomes absolutely good due to its connection to God's will.

The Ash'arite theory has been critiqued and challenged from various angles because this theory – though proposed with the aim of sanctifying God – results in incompatible with sound reason, divine justice, and the foundations of ethics and legislation. The 'Adliyyah (Imāmī Shī'ah and Mu'tazilah) reject this view by citing rational moral valuation and the necessity of divine grace.

Also, human reason, prior to any revealed text, knows that injustice is evil and justice is good. This knowledge does not stem from revelation but from rational axioms. As al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, and al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī have emphasized: "Every rational person endowed with reason knows the evil of injustice" (al-Ṭūsī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 86; al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī, Nahj al-Ḥaqq wa Kashf al-Ṣidq, p. 83). The Noble Qur’ān also confirms this rational discovery: "Indeed, Allah does not do injustice, [even] as much as an atom's weight" (Qur’ān 4:40).

On the other hand, if goodness and badness are purely revealed, then before the mission of the prophet, disbelievers could not comprehend the goodness of faith or the evil of disbelief-whereas the Qur’ān says inhabitant nature are also responsible. Also, if reason cannot comprehend the goodness of obeying God, what reason is there to obey Him? Can one say: "Obey God because He Himself said obey!"? This is begging the question (Ibn ‘Aṭiyyah, Abhā al-Midād, Vol. 2, p. 154).

The ‘Adliyyah believe: God, by wisdom of His grace, is rationally obliged to provide means of guidance. Obligation is a means for realizing the otherworldly benefit of subjects; and God, as a Wise being transcendent above any injustice or deficiency, is transcendent above leaving His subjects astray and without guidance (al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, al-Dhakhīrah, p. 108; al-Ṭūsī, al-Iqtiṣād, p. 64).

The necessity of grace means the rational necessity of obligation upon God, not meaning "others imposing obligation upon God," but rather reason's discovery of what God has obligated Himself to by His own essence. As al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī says: "Reason understands that injustice contradicts God's essential status; therefore, God is transcendent above injustice" (al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī, Nahj al-Ḥaqq, p. 83).

Also, if goodness and badness are completely variable and dependent on the Lawgiver's command, no ruling's stability is guaranteed. Today truthfulness is good, tomorrow-if God wills-falsehood will be good! This view undermines all ethical and legal principles and eliminates the possibility of rational argumentation in religion (al-Muẓaffar, Dalā’il al-Ṣidq, Vol. 3, pp. 260–272).

Even the Ash'arites themselves in practice use principles such as the necessity of Imamate for safeguarding religion; whereas based on their own theory, without explicit text, such necessity is irrational-unless it is accepted that reason can discern benefit, i.e., rational moral valuation is accepted.

The Shī'ah (and sometimes the Mu'tazilah), by accepting longitudinal agency-meaning humans are voluntary agents within God's agency-preserve the unity of divine action and affirm human free will. In this view, evil acts are attributed to humans (because they occur by their independent will), but the existence of the sphere of free will and the system of justice is attributed to God-which is absolutely good (Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, *Āmūzish-e Falsafah*, Vol. 2, p. 392).

Therefore, God's will includes humans being free; not that every act-even injustice-becomes good because it command from God. Rather, God, due to His perfection, is transcendent above any injustice or deficiency, and evil acts only occur through human choice within the framework of a wise system that, overall, is the best possible system.

In general, the Ash'arite view of "the absoluteness of divine will and volition," though proposed with the aim of sanctifying God, leads in practice to the denial of divine justice, ethical relativism, and the weakening of the foundations of religious legislation. In contrast, the 'Adliyyah theory, by accepting rational moral valuation and the necessity of divine grace, preserves the inherent dignity of humanity and guarantees the stability and rationality of divine rulings. This view is not only compatible with sound reason and human nature but also in complete harmony with Qur'ānic verses-such as the verse "Your Lord does not wrong anyone" (Qur'ān 18:49).

### *5.3. The Theory of Acquisition (Kasb)*

The theory of acquisition in Ash'arite theology presents an apparent solution for reconciling determinism and human free will and is used to justify the belief in the non-necessity of obligation upon God. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī, the founder of the Ash'arites, proposed this theory to explain the relationship between human voluntary acts and God's absolute power: God is the exclusive creator of all acts, but humans "acquire" them.

To avoid determinism and Mu'tazilī delegation (tafwīd), the Ash'arites proposed the theory of "acquisition." According to al-Ash'arī, God is the primary agent of human acts, and humans acquire them with their own power and will (which are created by God); the criterion for reward and punishment is this acquisition (al-Subhānī, *Buḥūth fī al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 2, p. 123).

The Ash'arites consider the unity of divine action a principle and consider God the exclusive agent of all acts, saying habitual and other causes are ineffective (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Qaḍā' wa al-Qadar*, p. 30; Ibn 'Aṭīyyah, *Abhā al-Midād*, Vol. 2, p. 155; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib al-Āliyah*, Vol. 9, p. 9; al-Ṭūsī, *al-Barāhīn al-Qāṭi'ah*, Commentator: Astarābādī, Vol. 2, p. 392; al-Mar'ashī, *Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq*, Vol. 1, p. 78). They also do not accept a single act having two independent agents, saying because it would necessitate the conjunction of two contradictories (God's will for existence, the servant's will for non-existence), which is impossible (Ḥammūd, *al-Fawā'id al-Bahiyyah*, Vol. 1, pp. 320, 323).

The most famous interpretation of the Ash'arite acquisition theory is the non-effective concomitance of human power with the divine creation of the act, like the concomitance of a container and its contents; human power has no effect in the actualization of the act, rather the human is the locus of its occurrence (al-Ījī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, n.d., Vol. 8, p. 146; al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtīṣād fī al-I'tiqād*, 1409 AH, pp. 59–61).

According to the Ash'arites, including al-Ghazālī, this theory is derived from Qur'ānic verses such as verses describing humans as acquirers of their acts (Qur'ān 14:51; 2:135, 141, 202) (al-Ghazālī, *Majmū'at Rasā'il*, p. 60; Furūzanfar, *Sharḥ-e Mathnawī-ye Sharīf*, Vol. 2, p. 560; Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam*, p. 723). Al-Bāqillānī considered acquisition as the creation of legal titles (like prayer) by humans, not the essence of the act. He says: If we consider humans creators of their own acts, this leads to polytheism in creation, because the necessity of human being the creator in obedience is that God created the human and his prayer, so they become partners in creating the praying human, and without the human, God's creativity would not be complete (al-Bāqillānī, *al-Inṣāf fīmā Yajib I'tiqāduh*, p. 193). However, here God's creativity and human creativity are not on the same level but are longitudinal, so no polytheism is necessitated.

Al-Taftāzānī described acquisition as the human's will prior to the divine creation of the act (al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-‘Aqā’id al-Nasafīyyah*, pp. 58–59, p. 213). Qadrān Qarāmalakī cites five interpretations: simultaneity, relational power, influence on aspects of the act, intention, and acknowledgment of free will (Qadrān Qarāmalakī, *Nigāh-e Sevvum be Jabr wa Ikhtiyār*, pp. 243–249).

From the Ash‘arite perspective, this apparent reconciliation of determinism and free will justifies the non-necessity of obligation upon God; because all acts are created by God and humans lack independent creative power, thus obligation does not become necessary upon Him, and divine justice in creation is preserved without human influence (al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-‘Aqā’id al-Nasafīyyah*, p. 213; al-Subḥānī, *Buḥūth fī al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 2, p. 113).

The Ash‘arites say because acts lack inherent goodness/badness, only revelation is the criterion (al-Mar‘ashī, *Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq*, Vol. 1, pp. 78, 118, 154; al-Kharāzī, *Bidāyat al-Ma‘ārif*, Vol. 1, p. 104; al-Qazwīnī, *al-Ālūsī wa al-Tashayyū‘*, p. 258). And on the other hand, determinism necessitates that God not do evil, so all acts (even evils) are good by revelation, and injustice is also good from the perspective of being God's act (al-Ṭūsī, *al-Barāhīn al-Qāṭi‘ah*, Commentator: Astarābādī, Vol. 2, p. 382). Consequently, obligation (compulsion beyond capacity) is not necessary upon God; the servant is compelled.

In general, from the theological perspective of the Ash‘arite school, the theory of "acquisition," proposed by figures like Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī and later developed by thinkers such as al-Ghazālī, al-Jurjānī, al-Taftāzānī, and al-Qūshjī, posits a dual relationship for human acts: from the perspective of existence and actualization, they are attributed to God; and from the perspective of "acquisition," they are attributed to humans. Within this framework, humans have no independent power to create an act before performing it. Rather, when their will is directed towards performing an action, God, at that very moment and simultaneously with the human's initiation of the act, creates the necessary power (capacity) for that act within them.

Al-Ghazālī states this position as follows: "When the servant's attachment to something occurs, divine capacity is found, which is called acquisition... The servant's power is at the moment of undertaking the action, not before it; therefore, whenever he undertakes the action, God Almighty creates for him a capacity at the moment of his undertaking it, and this is called acquisition." (al-Ghazālī, *Majmū'at Rasā'il*, p. 95) Accordingly, God's relationship to the act is effective attachment; meaning God directly creates the power and gives existence to the act. But the human's relationship to the same act is concomitant attachment (simultaneity without causal effect); meaning at the moment of undertaking, the human desires an action and simultaneously the necessary power is created within him. This simultaneity of human will with the creation of divine power is sufficient for the act to be attributed to the human and considered "acquisition," thus providing the basis for reward and punishment (al-Subḥānī, *Buḥūth fī al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 2, p. 200).

This approach is an attempt to find a balance between the unity of divine action and human moral responsibility, though it has been criticized by the 'Adliyyah (Imāmī Shī'ah and Mu'tazilah) for its inability to explain real free will and divine justice.

The 'Adliyyah (Mu'tazilah and Imāmī Shī'ah) consider the acquisition theory incapable of explaining free will and divine justice. Ja'far al-Subḥānī describes it as utterly ambiguous, noting that even al-Taftāzānī admits the inability to give a clear interpretation (al-Subḥānī, *al-Jabr wa al-Ikhtiyār*, p. 282; *Buḥūth fī al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 2, p. 134). Acquisition cannot justify obligation and responsibility because if human power is ineffective, it resembles determinism and divine justice (obligation beyond capacity) is violated (al-Subḥānī, *Buḥūth fī al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 2, pp. 152–154).

The Mu'tazilah and Shī'ah emphasize that human power must be effective in the act for obligation to be rational; acquisition denies this and reverts to determinism (al-Subḥānī, *al-Jabr wa al-Ikhtiyār*, pp. 268–269). Even some later Ash'arites like al-Juwaynī (al-Subḥānī, *Buḥūth fī al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 2, p. 141), al-Sha'rānī (al-Sha'rānī, *al-Yawāqīt wa al-Jawāhir*, Vol. 1, p. 253), Muḥammad 'Abduh (*Risālat al-Islām*, p. 49), and al-Shaltūt abandoned it because it is incompatible with the

Qur'ānic usage of acquisition and the principle of divine justice. These critiques are based on divine justice: God does not impose obligation beyond capacity, so humans must be independent agents (al-Subḥānī, *Buḥūth fī al-Milal wa al-Niḥal*, Vol. 2, pp. 152–154).

#### *5.4. Negation of Purpose and Final Cause from Divine Acts*

The negation of purpose and final cause from divine acts is one of the Ash'arites' main reasons for denying the necessity of divine obligation upon servants. The Ash'arites argue that if God Almighty's acts are directed towards a purpose or goal, this means God needs that purpose-conceived as "good" or "perfection"-and is deprived of it. Such a notion entails deficiency, poverty, and need in the absolutely perfect Divine Essence, which is incompatible with His nature of self-sufficiency and inherent richness. Therefore, they consider God's acts to be "without purpose" and reject attributing any goal or final cause to divine acts (al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād fī al-I'tiqād*, p. 110).

This theory stands in clear contrast to the school of the 'Adliyyah-which includes the Mu'tazilah and Imāmī Shī'ah-because the 'Adliyyah emphasize that divine obligation is always purposeful and contains wisdom and benefit for the obligated, even if no benefit accrues to God. The Ash'arites, however, consider any discussion of "purpose" in obligation to be outside the realm of rational knowledge and incompatible with the principle of God's self-sufficiency (al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtisād*, p. 110).

In this regard, al-Ghazālī, in a chapter titled "Chapter on God Almighty's Obligation of His Servants" in his *Majmū'at Rasā'il*, explains the structure of divine obligation with a medical analogy. He writes: "God Almighty's obligation upon servants is not like a human's obligation upon another, which is connected to a purpose and goal, and God has no share in obligating... God Almighty's obligation upon servants is like a physician's obligation upon a patient. If the patient wants to overcome a fever illness, the physician orders him to drink a coolant, and the physician himself has no need to drink it; the one who opposes causes no harm to him, and compliance brings him no benefit... Just as God Almighty created the cause of healing, He also created the cause of happiness, which is obedience, fighting the soul against prohibitions, and striving to purify from moral corruptions..." (al-Ghazālī, *Majmū'at al-Rasā'il al-Imām al-Ghazālī*, Vol. 1, p. 341).

In this statement, al-Ghazālī affirms that although obligation has positive moral and spiritual effects for servants (like healing for the patient), God has no involvement in this obligation as seeking benefit or expediency. In fact, he acknowledges that the goodness of obligation and its positive effects for humans is undeniable, but he does not accept that "the necessity of obligation upon God" is rationally good or obligatory for God, because: "How can obligation be necessary upon God, while He has no benefit in making obligation necessary upon servants, nor does any harm or deficiency threaten Him if it is not necessary?" (al-Ghazālī, *Majmū'at al-Rasā'il*, p. 341).

In response to this argument, it must be said that none of the 'Adliyyah theologians have ever claimed that divine obligation is directed towards God's own benefit or perfection, or that its omission would create a deficiency in His self-sufficient essence. Rather, all the 'Adliyyah agree that benefit, profit, harm, or danger entirely pertain to the servants, and obligation stems purely from divine mercy, grace, and favor. A contemporary thinker expresses this point precisely:

"This doubt is a fallacy and an analogy of the work of an imperfect and needy agent to the work of a perfect and inherently self-sufficient agent. For reason's judgment that 'an agent must perform an act from which benefit accrues to him' applies to an agent who is imperfect and wants to compensate for his deficiency through his act, not to an agent who is inherently self-sufficient... Reason does not have such a universal judgment that even an agent who is inherently self-sufficient and has no aspect of deficiency must consider a benefit in his act... Obligation, like the act of creation itself, is for the purpose of beneficence towards servants; because although it is a conventional and contractual matter... this conventional matter, despite being conventional, has the effect of bringing the obligated to new perfections they lack. Thus, obligation is a link between two realities: the imperfect human reality (before performing the obligation) and its perfect reality (after performing the obligation)." (Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *al-Mizān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, Vol. 8, p. 49).

Therefore, the main conflict here is not in accepting or denying the wisdom or expediency of obligation, but in how purpose is attributed to divine action. The ‘Adliyyah explicitly state that the existence of purpose in God's act does not mean need or deficiency, but points to God's inherent mercy and wisdom aimed at guiding and elevating servants. The Ash‘arites, fearing that this view would lead to attributing deficiency to the Divine Essence, declare all divine acts-including obligation-free from any independent purpose and final cause.

Given these four principles of the Ash‘arites, it becomes clear that the Ash‘arite school, relying on "revealed moral valuation," "absoluteness of will," "the theory of acquisition," and "negation of final cause," attempts to preserve God's independence and sanctity. However, this view, by denying rational moral valuation and rejecting the necessity of grace, leads to results incompatible with sound reason, divine justice, moral stability, and the stability of legal rulings. In contrast, the ‘Adliyyah theory-by accepting rational moral valuation, the necessity of grace, and human longitudinal agency-while preserving the inherent sanctification of God, strengthens the foundations of the rationality, justice, and stability of religion, aligning with human nature and Qur’ānic verses (such as "Indeed, Allah does not do injustice, [even] as much as an atom's weight" [Qur’ān 4:40]).

Therefore, the Ash‘arites' denial of the necessity of obligation upon God is not only irrational but, while appearing to sanctify, actually leads to the weakening of the ethical and theological foundations of religion.

### ***6. The Principles of the ‘Adliyyah Regarding the Necessity of Obligation upon God Almighty***

Here, the most important principles of the ‘Adliyyah view concerning the necessity of obligation upon God Almighty for servants are analyzed and examined:

#### ***6.1. Rational Moral Valuation***

For the ‘Adliyyah (Imāmī Shī‘ah and Mu‘tazilah), rational moral valuation means reason's independent perception of the goodness or badness of some voluntary acts of aware agents, which forms the basis for divine justice and the necessity of obligation upon God. The

‘Adliyyah believe human acts, under secondary descriptions such as justice, injustice, truthfulness, and falsehood, are inherently good or evil, and practical reason knows this axiomatically, though revelation clarifies some of them.

‘Adliyyah theologians, including Qādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Tamīmī (d. 415 AH), in *Sharḥ al-Mu‘tazilah* and *al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa al-‘Adl*, extensively prove rational moral valuation and consider it the basis for divine justice; for example, he says: "Reason knows the goodness of justice and the evil of injustice axiomatically" (*al-Mughnī*, Vol. 1, p. 52). Also, Ibrāhīm ibn Siyyār Naṣīr al-Dīn (d. 391 AH), in *al-Imāmah*, emphasizes the axiomatic nature of the goodness of acts (*al-Imāmah*, p. 123). Among Shī‘ah theologians, al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413 AH), in *Taṣḥīḥ al-I‘tiqād* and *al-Amālī*, makes the necessity of obligation contingent upon rational goodness: "Wisdom necessitates grace and obligation" (*Taṣḥīḥ al-I‘tiqād*, p. 47). Also, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460 AH), in *Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal* and *al-Ghaybah*, considers obligation good due to expediency (*Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, p. 342).

Al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī, in numerous theological works such as *Nahj al-Ḥaqq wa Kashf al-Ṣidq* and *Kashf al-Murād*, proves rational moral valuation as rational axioms and makes it the basis for the necessity of obligation upon God, because divine wisdom necessitates perfect and expedient acts. He states that rational people, for example, agree on the goodness of justice and the evil of injustice (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 82; *Kashf al-Murād*, Vol. 1, p. 302).

Al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī lists seven meanings of goodness and badness: 1) Existence and non-existence, 2) Perfection and deficiency, 3) Praise and blame, 4) Reward and punishment, 5) Conformity and opposition to purpose, 6) Conformity and opposition to the requirement of essence, 7) Grace and mercy. He identifies the point of contention as deservingness of praise/blame (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 81). This foundation saves divine justice from the purely revelational view of the Ash‘arites and makes obligation a necessity of divine wisdom, which is the basis for knowing prophethood and the hereafter (*Kashf al-Murād*, p. 238). Al-‘Allāmah concludes that rational goodness opens the door to God's transcendence above evils, and al-Ash‘arī, by denying it, attributes evil to God (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 87).

Al-‘Allāmah says regarding the ‘Adliyyah belief about rational moral valuation: "The Imāmīs and Mu‘tazilah believe that reason perceives the goodness and badness of some acts axiomatically and self-evidently, such as the goodness of beneficence and the evil of injustice, without need for revelation" (*Kashf al-Murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād*, p. 235). This rational perception is independent of revelation, and even atheists and Brahmins (Hindus) admit the goodness of justice and the evil of injustice, indicating a universal rational nature (*Dalā‘il al-Şidq*, Vol. 1, p. 368). Al-‘Allāmah emphasizes that the Ash‘arites' absolute denial is verbal, because in their sermons they acknowledge the goodness of justice and the evil of oppression (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 84).

Al-‘Allāmah presents three main arguments: First, the consensus of rational people on the goodness of justice and evil of injustice, even without revelation; for example, the doer of good deserves praise, and the oppressor deserves blame (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 82; *Kashf al-Murād*, Vol. 1, p. 302). Second, if goodness and badness were purely revelational, certainty in prophethood would be negated; because entrusting miracles to a liar is evil and reason knows it beforehand, so believing a claimant of prophethood after miracles becomes meaningless (*Dalā‘il al-Şidq*, Vol. 1, p. 368; *Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 84). Third, Qur‘ānic verses such as "Indeed, association [with Him] is great injustice" (*Qur‘ān* 31:13) call polytheism inherently great injustice, and "Everything with Him is by measure" (*Qur‘ān* 13:8) indicates God's wisdom in obligations, which is not understood without rational goodness (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 85). Al-‘Allāmah responds to the Ash‘arites' objection regarding negating God's free will: Rational goodness does not compel God to do evil, but His wisdom directs Him to good acts, like a human wise person who is obliged to justice without any deficiency in power (*Kashf al-Murād*, p. 236).

Al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī considers obligation (command and prohibition, sending prophets) necessary upon God, not in the sense of jurisprudential obligation upon God, but as necessitated by His inherent wisdom; because God is all-knowing and wise, so abandoning grace (obligation for guiding servants to happiness) is evil and incompatible with His perfection (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 83). He argues: "Wisdom

necessitates grace and obligation, because abandoning it results in loss of benefit and is evil; and God is transcendent above evil" (Dalā'il al-Ṣidq, Vol. 1, p. 369). That is, divine wisdom necessitates obligating, because it is good and involves otherworldly benefit, and abandoning it is evil due to the loss of servants' happiness. Against the Ash'arites who consider obligation pure grace without necessity, al-'Allāmah says this statement exposes God to deficiency, because a wise being does not abandon benefit; like a competent physician who considers prescribing medicine obligatory upon himself (Kashf al-Murād, p. 237). Also, the question on the Day of Judgment, "So what is [the matter] with you that you do not fear?" (Qur'ān 34:21) indicates the inherent evil of denying miracles, which reason judges before revelation (Nahj al-Ḥaqq, p. 86).

Al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī also addresses the Ash'arites' determinism in this regard, saying: If goodness were purely revelational, the servant would be compelled to receive reward and punishment, but reason acknowledges that the voluntary doer of good deserves praise (Dalā'il al-Ṣidq, Vol. 1, p. 370).

In general, the 'Adliyyah view, while preserving God's sanctity and inherent independence, by accepting rational moral valuation and the necessity of divine grace, guarantees moral stability, justice, the rationality of legislation, and human responsibility, aligning with human rational nature and Qur'ānic verses. In contrast, the Ash'arite view—despite its apparent sanctifying nature—by denying reason's discovery of ethical values, not only weakens the foundations of divine justice but may also lead, in practice, to an incomplete conception of God's essence. Therefore, the necessity of obligation upon God, meaning the rational necessity arising from His perfect attributes, is not only logical and Qur'ānic but also essential for preserving the rationality of religion and divine justice.

#### *6.2. The Necessity of the Concomitance of Essential Attributes with Acts*

For the 'Adliyyah, the concomitance of God's essential attributes (such as knowledge, power, and wisdom) with His acts necessitates the obligation of imposing obligation (commanding and prohibiting humans and sending prophets), because God's acts cannot be incompatible with His perfect attributes.

The 'Adliyyah (Imāmī Shī'ah and Mu'tazilah) consider essential attributes to be identical with the Divine Essence, being eternal, everlasting, and unlimited. Wisdom is among these attributes, and its opposite (ignorance or absurdity) is negated from God's essence (al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-Murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I'tiqād*, p. 236; al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, *Taṣḥīḥ al-I'tiqād*, p. 47). Al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī emphasizes: "Wisdom is an essential attribute identical with the Essence, and its concomitance with acts is absolute perfection; for God is All-Knowing, Wise, so His act must involve benefit, not absurdity" (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 83). Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī also says: "Essential attributes need nothing else, and acts necessarily accompany them because deficiency in the act implies deficiency in the essence" (*Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal*, p. 342). This concomitance, unlike the Ash'arites who consider attributes additional to the essence and acts absolute, affirms God's transcendence above evils.

From al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī's perspective, obligation (legislation of rulings and prophethood) is rationally good because it involves grace (guidance to otherworldly happiness). Abandoning it results in loss of benefit and is evil, and God's inherent wisdom necessitates good acts: "Wisdom necessitates grace and obligation, since abandoning it is evil due to loss of benefit, and God is transcendent above evil" (*Dalā'il al-Ṣidq*, Vol. 1, p. 369). He gives an example: A human wise person considers abandoning a patient's medicine evil without any deficiency in power; God, with inherent wisdom, does not tolerate abandoning obligation, so it is necessary (*Kashf al-Murād*, p. 237). Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār (Mu'tazilī) agrees: "Inherent wisdom necessitates good acts, and obligation is good because it involves the ultimate good" (*al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa al-'Adl*, Vol. 1, p. 52). This concomitance makes necessity not compulsion upon God, but necessitated by His essential perfection; denying it exposes God to deficiency (abandoning grace).

Al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī presents several proofs for this: First, the axiomatic rational goodness of justice/evil of injustice; God's essential attributes necessitate His acts following rational truth (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 82). Second, certainty in prophethood is based on the rational evil of entrusting miracles to a liar; inherent wisdom without obligation

renders prophethood absurd (*Dalā'il al-Ṣidq*, Vol. 1, p. 368). Third, the Qur'ān describes obligation as wise: "Everything with Him is by measure" (Qur'ān 13:8), confirming the concomitance of inherent wisdom with acts (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 85).

Al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī critiques the Ash'arite belief, saying that the belief in non-concomitance (absolute acts) leads to compulsion of the servant and divine absurdity, but God's inherent justice limits acts to goodness (*Kashf al-Murād*, p. 238).

In the discussion of the necessity of the concomitance of God's essential attributes-especially wisdom and justice-with His acts, the issue of the necessity of communicating obligation as one of the necessary consequences of this concomitance arises. This discussion is closely related to another issue known as one of the most important proofs for the necessity of communicating obligation: namely, the evil of punishment without notification. According to this, punishing someone who has never become aware of their obligation is incompatible with divine justice.

In this regard, al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī states: "Informing the obligated person of the obligation of the act, or its goodness, or indication to it, is a condition for the goodness of obligation from God; because it is part of the cause for which he was obligated." (*al-Ṭūsī, al-Iqtisād fī Ṭarīq al-Rashād*, p. 62).

According to him, until the obligation or goodness of an act is communicated to the obligated person, that act is not an obligation for him; because communication is part of the cause for the goodness of divine obligation itself.

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and later al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī in the commentary on *Tajrīd al-I'tiqād* emphasize the same point:

"And obligation is good because it involves a benefit not obtained without it, on the condition of notification... We made notification a condition; because if the obligated person does not know the obligation-imposer's will regarding the act, he is not obligated." (*al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-Murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I'tiqād*, p. 319).

This necessary connection between notification and obligation not only proves divine justice but also opens the door to God's

transcendence above any evil. Otherwise, rewarding and punishing a compelled human-as proposed in the deterministic approach of the Ash‘arites-would be irrational and unjust (Nahj al-Ḥaqq, p. 87).

Finally, al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī concludes that God's essential attributes, such as wisdom, necessitate that His acts be inherently good; therefore, obligation is also necessitated by wisdom, and abandoning it-i.e., not guiding servants-would mean deficiency in God's essence (Dalā’il al-Ṣidq, Vol. 1, p. 370).

Given the above, it becomes clear that the ‘Adliyyah (Imāmī Shī‘ah and Mu‘tazilah) consider God's essential attributes-especially wisdom-identical with His essence and necessitate His acts towards rational goodness and purposiveness. Therefore, obligation (guidance, legislation, and prophethood) is not merely pure grace but is necessitated by wisdom, because abandoning it means loss of benefit and deficiency in the Divine Essence. This necessary concomitance confirms divine justice and entails the evil of punishment without notification; meaning communicating obligation is a condition for its validity. In contrast, the Ash‘arite view, which liberates divine acts from any rational and ethical constraint, leads to determinism, absurdity, and ethical relativism. Consequently, accepting the concomitance of essential attributes with acts not only affirms God's transcendence above all evil but also strengthens the rational foundations of jurisprudence, prophethood, and the hereafter.

### *6.3. The Purposiveness of Divine Acts*

One of the most solid and central proofs for the necessity of obligation upon God Almighty in the ‘Adliyyah school (including Imāmī Shī‘ah and Mu‘tazilah) is the purposiveness of divine acts. Reason, by its own axioms, judges that the act of a wise being is never absurd or without purpose; because "‘abath" (absurdity)-performing an act without goal or benefit-is among rational evils, and God, by dictate of His essential perfection, is transcendent above any evil. Therefore, obligation-which includes sending prophets, legislating rulings, and guiding servants to otherworldly happiness-is not only pure grace but a necessary concomitant of God's inherent wisdom, and reason considers it inherently good and necessitated by wisdom.

The 'Adliyyah believe God is inherently wise, meaning His wisdom is identical with His essence and never separate from it. Therefore, all God's acts-including obligation-are purposeful and involve benefit for creatures. In this view, "purpose" means divine policy for realizing the existential perfection of servants, not a need or essential requirement from God. As al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī emphasizes:

"Any act not done for a purpose is absurd, and absurdity is evil, and God Almighty is impossible for Him to do evil." (al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-Murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād*, p. 64).

Al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, citing numerous Qurʾānic verses, also expresses this point:

"God created for the benefits of creation and did not inform anyone from His creation of the details of the causes for which He created, commanded, and obligated, although He informed in general that He did not create creation absurdly but created them for wisdom and benefit, and indicated this by reason and revelation. So He, glory be to Him, said: 'We did not create the heaven and the earth and that between them in play' (Qurʾān 21:16), and said: 'Then did you think that We created you uselessly?' (Qurʾān 23:115), and said: 'Indeed, We have created everything according to a measure' (Qurʾān 54:49) meaning with truth and placed it in its place, and said: 'And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me' (Qurʾān 51:56), and said regarding what He obligated: 'Their meat will not reach Allah, nor will their blood, but what reaches Him is piety from you' (Qurʾān 22:37). God created creation for benefits, though He did not inform any of His creation of the details of the causes of creation and legislation. However, He informed in general that creation is not absurd but based on wisdom and benefit, and both reason and law prove this." (al-Mufīd, *Taṣḥīḥ al-Iʿtiqādāt*, Vol. 1, p. 58). Therefore, purposelessness and absurd creation are not only improper but a kind of essential deficiency incompatible with God's essence.

This view stands against the Ashʿarite opinion that considers divine acts absolute and without purpose, deeming any attribution of purpose to God's acts to entail need and deficiency. The 'Adliyyah respond that purpose in divine action is not a deficiency for the agent, but a perfection for the object; God performs creation and obligation for the purpose of another-i.e., the benefit of creatures-without Himself having any need.

Obligation is rationally good because it provides the means for servants to attain otherworldly happiness and great reward. Abandoning obligation means loss of purpose and essential benefit, which reason considers evil. Therefore, a wise being transcendent above any deficiency rationally and necessarily must establish obligation.

In this regard, al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī in *Dalā’il al-Ṣidq*, Vol. 1, p. 369 and *Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 83, gives an example: "A competent physician prescribes medicine for the purpose of healing the patient; abandoning prescription is evil. God, with inherent wisdom, sends obligation for the ultimate good of servants."

This argument aligns with numerous Qur’ānic verses cited by al-Shaykh al-Mufīd and also referenced by al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī in various instances (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 85).

Also, Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār (Mu‘tazilī) in *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah* (p. 291) writes: "Obligation is for the purpose of benefit for the obligated, and abandoning it is foolishness impossible for the Wise," meaning abandoning obligation is a kind of folly incompatible with a wise essence.

Al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī presents three categories of arguments for the purposiveness of divine acts and the necessity of obligation:

First, rational proof: Rational people unanimously consider absurd acts evil and wise acts purposeful (*Kashf al-Murād*, p. 237).

Second, scriptural proof: Numerous verses such as the verses of al-Dukhān and al-Mu‘minūn, and also the verse "To your Lord is the final goal" (Qur’ān 53:42), which shows all matters return to God, testify to the overall purposiveness of divine acts.

Third, critical proof: The Ash‘arite view that considers acts purposeless leads to absurdity in creation and futility in prophethood—whereas reason and revelation both consider prophethood a means of guidance (*Dalā’il al-Ṣidq*, Vol. 1, p. 368).

He emphasizes that "the purpose of the act is not deficiency, but perfection for another; God creates and obligates for the purpose of creatures" (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 84).

Accepting the purposiveness of divine acts has profound and multifaceted consequences shaping the overall structure of theological, ethical, and jurisprudential views:

First, this belief stabilizes divine justice on a solid foundation: God, by dictate of His inherent wisdom, never leaves servants in aimlessness and confusion but guides them to happiness and perfection through guidance and obligation.

Second, this perspective challenges the determinism of the Ash'arite school; because if obligation is purposeful, humans must have real free will to be deserving of reward or punishment for their acts (Kashf al-Murād, p. 238).

Third, purposiveness highlights the rationality of obligation itself: obligation is not a meaningless imposition or mere burden but a divine opportunity bestowed upon humans to reach the peak of existential perfection and closeness to God through it.

Fourth, this view guarantees God's transcendence above all evil; because any act lacking benefit and purpose is rationally evil, and God-transcendent above all defect and deficiency-never performs such an act.

In conclusion, the purposiveness of divine acts not only opens a window to God's transcendence above any deficiency but also proves the necessity of divine grace-including obligation for guiding servants-as an inherent necessity arising from God's flawless wisdom (Dalā'il al-Şidq, Vol. 1, p. 370).

In general, this theological principle is the foundational basis for 'Adliyyah beliefs, proving prophethood through miracles and rational proofs, and justifying the hereafter and human moral responsibility. Without accepting purposiveness and the necessity of obligation, not only is divine justice called into question, but the entire religious structure based on free will, responsibility, and hope for divine reward collapses.

#### *6.4. The Necessity and Requirement of Divine Grace (Lutf)*

In the 'Adliyyah theological school, the necessity of divine grace is one of the main pillars for proving the necessity of obligation upon God. This necessity does not mean "jurisprudential obligation upon the Divine Essence," but rather a rational necessity arising from God's perfect attributes, especially wisdom and mercy. Because grace-as

defined by theologians-is an act that brings the obligated closer to obedience and distances them from sin, and since it involves essential benefit, God's inherent wisdom necessitates its performance. As al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī, in his theological works including *Kashf al-Murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād* (p. 325) and *Nahj al-Ḥaqq wa Kashf al-Ṣidq* (p. 83), divides grace into three categories:

Actual grace from God: Such as sending prophets and legislating rulings, which is necessary upon God because without it, the purpose of obligation-i.e., otherworldly happiness-would be unattainable.

Actual grace from the obligated: Such as obedience; God must make this obedience manifest and obligate the person to it.

Actual grace from others: Such as the existence of an infallible Imam, which is a condition for knowing obligation and establishing justice; and providing such conditions is also necessary upon God (al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī, *Anwār al-Malakūt*, p. 154).

Al-ʿAllāmah writes regarding the necessity of grace from God Almighty:

"Grace is necessary because with it the purpose of the obligated (i.e., otherworldly happiness) is achieved, and abandoning it necessarily defeats the purpose." (al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-Murād*, p. 328).

Also, al-Shaykh al-Mufīd in *Awāʿil al-Maqālāt* (p. 59) explicitly states that grace is necessary "from the aspect of generosity and grace," not because of "compulsory justice"; meaning God bestows grace because of His giving essence, not due to external compulsion.

Al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī presents several proofs for the necessity of grace, including:

a. The Proof of Power and Motive: Whenever an agent has the power and rational motive (dāʿī) to perform a good act, and abandoning it entails loss of benefit, that act becomes necessary-just as a physician who can prescribe medicine and aims to heal the patient, abandoning the prescription is evil (al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī, *Anwār al-Malakūt*, p. 154).

b. The Proof of Rational Goodness: Grace is inherently good, and abandoning it-especially regarding obligation-entails rational evil, because obligation is "actualizing grace" or "approaching grace"; meaning it either directly leads to obedience or brings the obligated closer to it (al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, *al-Dhakhīrah*, p. 186; *Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 83).

c. The Proof of Inherent Mercy: God, by dictate of His inherent mercy, encourages the obligated to obedience, and obligation is the highest exemplar of this mercy (*Dalā'il al-Ṣidq*, Vol. 1, p. 369).

Therefore, obligation without grace (such as prophethood or guidance) is incomplete and absurd. Al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī summarizes this relationship thus: "Power accompanied by motive equals the necessity of the act, and obligation is the most purposeful grace." (*Kashf al-Murād*, p. 325).

This view is also confirmed by Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār in *al-Mughnī* (Vol. 1, p. 291), who says: "Grace is necessary upon the Wise, and obligation is the grace of generosity."

Al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī critiques the Ashʿarite view that considers grace non-necessary: "Denying the necessity of grace renders divine acts absurd and God purposeless; whereas reason judges a wise being never abandons benefit." (*Kashf al-Murād*, p. 326).

In response to the objection that "why do some remain disbelievers despite grace?", al-ʿAllāmah explains that grace brings the obligated closer, not compels; meaning the disbeliever, knowing reward and punishment, has also received grace but turns away from faith by his own choice (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 86).

This principle not only proves the necessity of obligation but also establishes the foundations for other fundamentals such as the necessity of Imamate, the infallibility of the Imams, and the necessity of the hereafter.

In conclusion, grace is a necessity from the requirements of God's inherent wisdom; therefore, obligation is necessary, and abandoning it is considered a deficiency in the Divine Essence (*Dalā'il al-Ṣidq*, Vol. 1, p. 370).

In general, the principle of "the necessity of divine grace" from the ʿAdliyyah perspective is a rational and divine foundation for justifying the purposiveness of divine acts and the necessity of obligation. God, by dictate of His inherent wisdom and mercy, has made obligation necessary upon Himself not out of need, but because of a grace that secures the benefit of servants. This grace is a kind of existential perfection for the creature, not a deficiency for the Creator. And this very principle opens the door to God's transcendence above absurdity and evil and establishes the foundations of jurisprudence, the principles of religion, and divine justice on the firmest basis of reason and revelation.

### 6.5. *The Perpetual Need of Humans for Divine Laws*

One of the most central proofs of philosophers and ‘Adliyyah theologians for the necessity and requirement of divine obligations and law is the structural need of humans for law and an ethical-social order. This need is not a historical or temporary exigency but an existential necessity arising from human nature and innate structure. Humans, by virtue of being a composite of a higher soul (intellect and spirit) and a material soul (desire and anger), need an order beyond pure reason to attain spiritual perfection individually and establish a sustainable and just collective life socially.

Al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī in *Kashf al-Murād* (p. 320) expresses this need as follows:

"Since humankind needs mutual assistance and cooperation, mutual assistance and cooperation necessitate law and a program whose application in self-discipline, contemplation of lofty and high matters (transcendent truths and values), and remembrance of warnings, requires a foundation of effective and beneficial justice-in addition to which it also brings divine reward."

This view is not exclusive to al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī; other prominent theologians and commentators such as Sayyid ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Ṭayyib (*Kalam al-Ṭayyib*, pp. 123–124), Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-‘Ābidīn al-‘Āmilī al-‘Āmmilī (*Laṭā’if Ghibiyyah*, pp. 204–205), and al-‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī (*al-Mīzān*, Vol. 12, p. 199) have also emphasized this principle.

Divine obligation can be divided into two categories:

**Rational Obligations:** Acts whose goodness or evil is independently discerned by reason, such as justice, truthfulness, trustworthiness, and keeping promises. These principles are universal and innate, affirmed even among non-Muslims.

**Revealed (Wahy-based) Obligations:** Acts about which reason is silent regarding their goodness or evil and are specified only through revelation, such as the details of prayer, fasting, alms, etc. Most legal rulings fall into this category.

This classification shows that although reason is capable regarding principles, it is incapable regarding the particulars and details of the benefits and harms of acts. Therefore, divine wisdom necessitates that God, through prophets, provides a complete and comprehensive program for guiding human individual and social life.

The Noble Qur'ān also clearly confirms this principle. In a verse many theologians consider the "divine practice of justice," it states: "And never would We punish until We sent a messenger" (Qur'ān 17:15). This verse indicates that divine justice necessitates completion of proof; meaning God provides necessary guidance and legislation for humans before any punishment. Without divine law, moral and social responsibility would be baseless.

Āyatullāh Ṭabarsī in *Kifāyat al-Muwahhīdīn* (Vol. 1, p. 505) logically warns that if God leaves servants without obligation and divine law, the primary purpose of creation-i.e., eternal happiness and servants drawing near to God-would be negated. In such a hypothesis, human creation would be considered absurd and futile, and God-Who is transcendent above any absurdity-would be violating His own purpose: "If obligation were not necessary, it would necessarily follow that He, glory be to Him, violates His purpose, and His act would be absurd and futile, and He is greatly exalted above that."

He also points to the social consequences of this hypothesis: Without divine policy and "the whip of obligation," each individual would follow their own desires, and soon human social order would collapse, because "encroachment" upon others' property, rights, and dignity would lead to disasters and corruptions incompatible with "God's inherent grace and justice."

The Qur'ān explains this connection in the famous verse of innate disposition (*fiṭrah*): "So direct your face toward the religion, inclining to truth. [Adhere to] the disposition of Allah upon which He has created [all] people. No change should there be in the creation of Allah. That is the correct religion..." (Qur'ān 30:30). This verse states that the true religion is the very divine innate disposition upon which humans are created. The monotheistic innate disposition inherently seeks a monotheistic law. Therefore, divine obligation is not an external matter but the fulfillment of an innate, inherent need. Humans, from within, desire law, justice, and spiritual values; and this very desire is the basis for accepting divine law and celestial obligations.

In summary, the perpetual need of humans for divine laws is not merely an empirical or historical observation but a rational-innate proof justifying the necessity of divine obligation from reason's perspective, confirming divine justice in the completion of proof, proving the necessity of prophethood and revelation based on reason's incapacity in particulars, and revealing the inherent connection between innate disposition and divine law. Within this framework, divine law is not a restriction on freedom but a path from the Wise Creator for humans-within the framework of their innate and social needs-to attain perfection and eternal happiness.

#### *6.6. The Necessity of Inducing Evil in Case of the Non-Necessity of Obligation*

The necessity of inducing evil (*ighrā' ilā al-qabā'ih*) in case of the non-necessity of obligation is a key proof for the necessity of obligation upon God from the 'Adliyyah perspective, because abandoning obligation leaves humans in ignorance of good and evil and makes entrusting miracles to a liar possible, which is rationally evil.

Inducing evil means encouraging or placing another in a situation leading to evil action, such as entrusting a miracle (a divine sign) to a false claimant of prophethood without distinction; this is evil because it is injustice, defeats the purpose, and contradicts wisdom (al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-Murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I'tiqād*, p. 237; Qāḍī 'Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa al-'Adl*, Vol. 1, p. 90).

Al-'Allāmah al-Ḥillī, while explaining al-Khwājā's words in this regard, writes:

"The absence of obligation entails the occurrence of an evil act and causes God to do an evil act; because if God does not bring obligation upon a being that has the conditions for obligation-meaning all the characteristics of a being that can be obligated exist in it. If the conditions for obligation are available in a being and God does not bring obligation, He has done an evil act; because this being has characteristics that naturally, without being obligated, incline towards evils and ugliness. Although humans have intellect and inclination towards truth, there also exists in them an inclination towards falsehood. Now that humans have the capacity for obligation and can

be deterred from evil, and if left alone they naturally incline towards evils, is abandoning obligation tantamount to an evil act or not? Certainly, reason considers abandoning obligation evil; therefore, revealing divine law is necessary." (al-Hillī, *Kashf al-Murād fī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I'tiqād*, 1407 AH, pp. 321–322).

Also, al-'Allāmah explains: "If obligation were not necessary, God would leave humans without revealed guidance, so distinguishing truth from falsehood in claims of prophethood would be impossible, and miracles would be entrusted to liars, which is inducing falsehood and rationally evil." (al-'Allāmah al-Hillī, *Nahj al-Ḥaqq wa Kashf al-Ṣidq*, p. 84).

The goodness of obligation equals its necessity, and the absence of obligation equals the issuance of an evil act from God; as al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī states while explaining the issue of the goodness of the necessity of obligation:

"... If God is able to make the obligated independent of evil through good and does not do so and inclines him to his inner desires and leaves him between himself and his desires, then if there is no purpose for this act it is futile, and if there is a purpose for this act, its purpose must only be obligation and compelling him according to his desire, even if it is difficult for him, for the sake of the great benefit of reward; and if this is not the case, encouragement to strengthen motives for attaining it becomes necessary..." (al-Ṭūsī, *al-Iqtisād fīmā Yata'allaq bi al-I'tiqād*, 1406 AH, pp. 111–112).

Al-'Allāmah al-Hillī presents several proofs for this issue: First, certainty in prophethood is based on the rational evil of entrusting miracles to a liar; without obligation (revelation for distinction), humans remain in ignorance and God leads them to deny real miracles or believe false ones (*Dalā'il al-Ṣidq*, Vol. 1, p. 368; *Kashf al-Murād*, p. 303). Second, the purpose of creation is guidance; abandoning obligation places the needy human in evil (misguidance), like leaving a child in danger without a guide (*Nahj al-Ḥaqq*, p. 85). Third, the Qur'ān indicates the evil of inducement: "So what is [the matter] with you that you do not fear?" (Qur'ān 34:21), the question to the deniers points to the self-evident evil of denying miracles before revelation (*Kashf al-*

Murād, p. 238). Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī agrees: "Absence of obligation necessitates inducement to aggression, and wisdom is transcendent above it." (Talkhīṣ al-Muḥaṣṣal, p. 342).

Al-ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī, while criticizing the Ashʿarite view in this regard, states: "The belief in the non-necessity of obligation renders divine acts absurd and God an inducer to evil, because without revelation, humans are incapable of distinguishing miracles and exposed to temptation (believing falsehood or denying truth)." (Nahj al-Ḥaqq, p. 86).

Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār also writes about this necessity: "Obligation is necessary to repel inducement to evil, because ignorance of benefit leads to misguidance." (Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah, p. 291). This proof establishes the necessity of prophethood, Imamate, and infallibility.

In conclusion, the necessity of inducement without obligation violates wisdom and makes obligation necessary (Dalāʿil al-Ṣidq, Vol. 1, p. 370). This principle distinguishes the justice of the ʿAdliyyah from the absolutism of the Ashʿarites.

In summary, humans, by dictate of their innate structure, have inclinations that, in the absence of guidance, lead them towards evil acts. If God leaves such a being without obligation and guidance, He has essentially provided the ground for sin and indirectly invited or induced to evil, which is utterly incompatible with God's sanctity, wisdom, and inherent justice. Therefore, obligation is not merely discretionary grace but an inherent necessity dictated by God's perfect attributes-especially His transcendence above any evil. And abandoning obligation, leaving humans exposed to base inclinations, is itself a kind of evil act, and reason considers it impossible for a Wise essence. Consequently, the necessity of divine obligation to prevent this implicit inducement to evil is a solid, rational, and divine principle that both stabilizes divine justice and preserves the sanctity of God's essence from any deficiency or resemblance to evil.

### Final Conclusion and Practical Comparison of the Views

In Islamic theological systems, the issue of "the necessity of divine obligation" represents two fundamental and sometimes opposing approaches: the Ash'arite view and the 'Adliyyah view. This disagreement is rooted in how each school understands God's essence, His attributes, and the relationship between reason and revelation.

From the Ash'arite perspective, divine obligation is solely a manifestation of God's absolute and uncaused will. By denying "rational moral valuation," they reject any inherent or rational necessity for establishing obligation. In this view, God could have created a world without obligation, and this would be neither just nor unjust, because justice and injustice only acquire meaning after legislation. Therefore, the system of obligation is merely a discretionary, non-necessary grace.

In contrast, the 'Adliyyah, based on the principle of "rational moral valuation" and emphasizing perfect attributes-especially wisdom, justice, and mercy-consider the necessity of obligation to be inherent. The Wise God, as an essence whose every act is aligned with the purpose of guiding and bringing happiness to humans, cannot establish obligation aimlessly or without guidance. From this perspective, establishing obligation accompanied by means of guidance (such as prophethood) is an inseparable manifestation of divine attributes, not an arbitrary choice.

This disagreement clearly manifests in responses to questions such as "Could God have given miracles to a liar?" or "Was a world without obligation possible?": The Ash'arites accept such possibilities within the scope of absolute will, while the 'Adliyyah consider them rationally impossible and incompatible with divine wisdom.

The 'Adliyyah view is superior in several respects: First, by accepting rational foundations, it enables all humans to discern good and evil and strengthens the rationality of religion. Second, it guarantees divine justice in punishment and reward. Third, it saves creation and prophethood from absurdity. Fourth, it ensures global moral and legal stability. Fifth, it aligns with numerous Qur'anic verses,

including the verses on delivering the message, sending messengers, and not imposing obligation beyond capacity.

In conclusion, the necessity of obligation upon God, not in the sense of external imposition but as an inherent necessity arising from His perfect attributes, is a rational, ethical, and Qur'ānic necessity. The 'Adliyyah view, while preserving divine sanctification and harmonizing reason and revelation, has clear superiority over the Ash'arite view.

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